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In this paper, the serious problem of disinformation is discussed.  
It is argued that, in order to deal with this problem, we first need 
to understand exactly what disinformation is.  The philosophical 
method of conceptual analysis is described, and a conceptual 
analysis of disinformation is offered.  Finally, how this analysis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accuracy is a critical dimension of information quality (cf. [1]).  
People can easily acquire false beliefs about the world as a result 
of inaccurate and misleading information.  And such false beliefs 
can often lead to significant emotional, physical, and financial 
harm. 
 
Inaccurate and misleading information can have such bad 
consequences whether the source of the information made an 
honest mistake (misinformation) or actually intended to deceive 
(disinformation).1  But how we deal with the problem of 
inaccurate and misleading information can depend on the 
intentions of the source.  For example, effective techniques for 
identifying disinformation are likely to be different from the 
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 We might hold that disinformation and misinformation are 
mutually exclusive categories (cf. [2], p. 134).  Alternatively, we 
might hold that disinformation is a proper subset of 
misinformation.  In other words, misinformation would simply be 
inaccurate information in general (cf. [3], p. 201).  I do not take a 













techniques that work for inaccurate and misleading information in 
general.  Indeed, it will often be more difficult to identify 
disinformation since the source of the information does not want 
us to realize that the information is inaccurate or misleading.   
 
Disinformation is nothing new, of course.  Forged documents, 
doctored photographs, deceptive advertising, deliberately falsified 
maps, and government propaganda have been around for years.  
The standard example is the disinformation campaign, known as 
Operation Bodyguard, used during World War Two to hide the 
intended location of the D-Day invasion (cf. [4], pp. 71-75).  
Among other deceits, the Allies sent out fake radio transmissions 
in a successful attempt to convince the Germans that there was a 
large force in East Anglia that was ready to attack Calais (rather 
than Normandy).  However, disinformation has recently become a 
much more pressing threat to information quality. 
 
New information technologies are making it easier for people to 
create and disseminate information that is intended to deceive.2  
For example, people are able to deceive Internet users by creating 
websites that “impersonate” the websites of reputable sources of 
information (cf. [5]).  Also, people are able to convincingly 
manipulate visual images (cf. [6]).  In fact, it now requires very 
little technical skill to create and widely disseminate 
disinformation.  For example, anyone with Internet access can 
anonymously insert misleading information into Wikipedia (cf. 
[7]). 
 
Moreover, the problem of disinformation is a critical one for 
information science (cf. [2], [7], p. 1665, [9], [10], [11], [12]).  
Libraries and other information services can easily end up being 
unwitting (and sometimes witting) conduits for the spread of 
disinformation.  In addition to the disinformation that patrons may 
access over the Internet, many library collections include 
government propaganda and historical fabrications (cf. [13]).  
Recognizing the problem of disinformation, the American Library 
Association has recently issued a “Resolution on Disinformation, 
Media Manipulation & the Destruction of Public Information” 
[14]. 
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 There was the same sort of opportunity for deception when new 
printing technology first made books widely available.  In 
particular, there was often a question of whether you held in your 
hands the authoritative version of a given text (cf. [8], pp. 30-31).  
Techniques eventually developed for assuring ourselves of the 
authority and reliability of books.  But such techniques are not 
always immediately available with new information technologies. 
  
In order to deal with this threat to information quality, information 
scientists need to find answers to several important questions 
about disinformation.  For example: 
 
• Why is disinformation as prevalent as it is? 
• Under what circumstances is disinformation most prevalent? 
• How can we deal effectively with the problem of 
disinformation? 
• How can disinformation be identified? 
• Can the problem of disinformation be dealt with in a way 
that does not violate rights to free speech and intellectual 
freedom? 
 
Before we can address these questions, however, we need to 
understand exactly what disinformation is.  In other words, we 
need a conceptual analysis of disinformation. 
 
2. THE METHOD OF CONCEPTUAL 
ANALYSIS 
Several years ago, the information scientist Christopher Fox gave 
an influential conceptual analysis of information and 
misinformation [3].  But he did not consider disinformation.  This 
paper will provide a conceptual analysis of disinformation and 
will briefly indicate how such an analysis can help us to address 
the aforementioned questions. 
 
The goal of the method of conceptual analysis is to find a list of 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that correctly classify 
things as falling under a given concept or not (cf. [15], section 
2.1).  Plato famously used this method in his dialogues to try to 
understand such concepts as justice, knowledge, and love.  For 
example, according to the “Platonic” analysis of knowledge, 
something is knowledge if and only if it is justified, true, and 
believed.  That is, if something is knowledge, then it is justified, 
true, and believed (the necessity condition).  Also, if something is 
justified, true, and believed, then it is knowledge (the sufficiency 
condition).  In our case, we need to find a list of conditions that 
are necessary and jointly sufficient for something to count as 
disinformation.   
 
In order to determine if such an analysis is correct, the method of 
conceptual analysis has us appeal to the intuitions of competent 
speakers of the language about whether particular (often 
hypothetical) cases fall under the given concept (cf. [3], pp. 24-
25).  As the philosopher of language John Austin pointed out in 
[16], leveraging intuitions in this way can help us to understand 
important phenomena in the real world.  For example, to test the 
Platonic analysis of knowledge, we look at things that our 
intuition tells us are instances of knowledge and check them 
against the proposed conditions (i.e., are they justified, true, and 
believed?).  Also, we look at things that satisfy the proposed 
conditions (i.e., things that are justified, true, and believed) and 
consider whether our intuition says that they are instances of 
knowledge (cf. [17]).  In our case, we need to appeal to intuitions 
about whether specific pieces of information count as 
disinformation (given that we know certain things like whether 
the information is accurate, who created the information, why 
they created it, etc.).  
 
Admittedly, ‘disinformation’ is a relatively new term compared 
with terms like ‘knowledge’ and ‘lying’.  It is only about fifty 
years old.  As a result, the meaning of ‘disinformation’ may not be 
quite as fixed as the meaning of these other terms.  However, we 
must have somewhat stable, shared intuitions about the use of the 
term.  Otherwise, we would not be able to communicate 
effectively with each other using the term.  Moreover, even if 
there is some disagreement about whether the term applies to 
certain cases, the method of conceptual analysis can still yield a 
useful taxonomy of deceptive phenomena in the vicinity of 
disinformation. 
 
3. THE VARIETIES OF DISINFORMATION 
Before we start trying to identify necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for disinformation, it will be useful to lay out the main 
varieties of disinformation with some examples.   
 
(1) Disinformation is usually taken to be a governmental or 
military activity (as with Operation Bodyguard).  As George 
Carlin put it, “the government doesn’t lie, it engages in 
disinformation.”  In addition, the standard dictionary definition of 
disinformation is “deliberately misleading information announced 
publicly or leaked by a government or especially by an 
intelligence agency.”3  However, other organizations can also 
produce “deliberately misleading information.”  In particular, 
news services are frequently sources of disinformation (cf. [4], pp. 
23-53).  In fact, single individuals are often the source of 
disinformation.  For example, individual reporters (e.g., Jayson 
Blair of the New York Times and Janet Cooke of the Washington 
Post) have simply made up stories.  Also, there have recently been 
some high-profile cases of purported memoirs that turned out to 
be fictional creations (cf. [18], [19]).   
 
(2) Disinformation is often the product of a carefully planned and 
technically sophisticated deceit (as with Operation Bodyguard).  
For example, hackers have intentionally disseminated inaccurate 
information by directly modifying the websites of news services 
such as Yahoo! News and the New York Times (cf. [20]).  
However, creating disinformation can be as simple as telling a lie.  
For example, when President Clinton said to the American people, 
“I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss 
Lewinsky,” he was disinforming them.  In fact, even manipulating 
the contents of a website does not always require sophisticated 
hacking skills.  Anyone can purposely (and anonymously) add 
inaccurate information to Wikipedia.  For example, the entry on 
the journalist John Seigenthaler was famously modified to falsely 
claim that he was involved in the Kennedy assassinations (cf. [7], 
p. 1665). 
 
(3) Disinformation does not always come directly from the 
organization or the individual that intends to deceive.  For 
example, news services have often been tricked into disseminating 
inaccurate or misleading information created by someone else.  A 
few years ago, an investor created a fraudulent press release 
stating that the CEO of Emulex Corporation had just resigned (cf. 
[5]).  When this fraudulent press release was subsequently 
published by several news services (including Bloomberg, CBS 
Marketwatch, and Dow Jones), Emulex stock lost over half its 
value in just a few hours.   
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 This definition comes from the American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language (2006, 4th edition).  The Oxford English 
Dictionary provides almost exactly the same definition. 
  
 
(4) Disinformation is often written or verbal information.  But 
other types of inaccurate information (e.g., doctored photographs) 
can also be disinformation (cf. [6]).  For instance, Stalin and Mao 
each had people who had fallen out of favor removed from 
photographs.4  Also, during the Cold War, the Soviets deliberately 
falsified maps in an attempt to fool their enemies about where 
important sites were located (cf. [21], pp. 115-118). 
 
(5) Disinformation is often distributed very widely (e.g., to 
anyone with a newspaper subscription, to anyone with a 
television, to anyone with Internet access).  But disinformation 
can also be targeted at specific people or organizations.  For 
example, Jeff Danzinger (of the Los Angeles Times) has a cartoon 
that shows a couple working on their taxes.  The caption is “Mr. 
and Mrs. John Doe (not their real names) hard at work in their 
own little Office of Strategic Disinformation.”  Such 
disinformation is presumably aimed directly at the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
 
(6) The intended victim of the deception is usually a person or a 
group of people.  But disinformation can also be targeted at a 
machine.  As Clifford Lynch points out in [22], managers of 
websites sometimes try fool the automated “crawlers” sent out by 
search engines to index the Internet.  For example, suppose that 
you have just started selling a product that competes with another 
product Y.  When an automated crawler asks for your webpage to 
add to its index, you might send it a copy of the webpage for 
product Y.  That way, when someone uses the search engine to 
search for product Y, the search engine will return a link to your 
webpage. 
 
4. DISINFORMING = LYING? 
Just as Fox began his analysis of information by analyzing the 
activity of informing, this paper begins by analyzing the activity 
of disinforming.  In the following section, I will consider the 
phenomenon of disinformation itself. 
 
A plausible suggestion that philosophers (e.g., [23], p. 231) have 
made is that disinforming is essentially the same as lying.  This 
equivalence is also suggested by the very title of Russ Kick’s You 
Are Being Lied to: The Disinformation Guide to Media Distortion, 
Historical Whitewashes and Cultural Myths.  In addition, George 
Carlin’s comment suggests that disinformation is just a 
euphemism for lying. 
 
This characterization of disinforming is very illuminating and 
reasonably close to being correct.  As noted above, lying often 
does count as disinforming.  But there are several important 
respects in which lying is not the same as disinforming.  These 
complications need to be considered in order to give a precise 
analysis of disinforming. 
 
4.1 Intending to Deceive 
To begin with, there are a couple of respects in which 
disinforming is a more restrictive concept than lying.  That is, it is 
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 Similarly, in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
functionaries in the Ministry of Truth continually altered historical 
records to insure that the government was always right. 
possible to lie without disinforming.  First of all, in order to 
disinform, you have to intend to deceive someone (cf. [2], p. 134, 
[23], p. 231).  But it is possible to lie to someone even if you do 
not intend to deceive her (cf. [24], p. 289, [25], [26]).  For 
example, suppose that you are guilty of a crime that everyone 
knows that you committed.  However, there is not enough 
evidence to convict unless you confess.  So, you say to the police, 
“I am innocent,” even though you know that they will not believe 
you.  In this case, you have lied to the police.  But you have not 
disinformed them because you do not intend them to believe 
something false (i.e., you do not intend to deceive them).  As Roy 
Sorensen points out in [25], such “bald-faced lies do not fool 
anyone.  They are no more a threat to truth telling than sarcastic 
remarks.” 
 
Of course, most lies are intended to deceive.  And these are 
arguably the most important type of lies.  For example, these are 
the lies that we build lie detectors to detect.  In addition, these are 
the lies that most philosophers (especially moral philosophers) are 
interested in.  In fact, the standard philosophical analysis of lying 
requires an intention to deceive (cf. [27], section 1.4).  James 
Fetzer probably intended to equate disinforming with such 
deceptive lying. 
 
(D1) You disinform X if and only if: 
1. You say that p to X. 
2. You believe that p is false. 
3. By saying p, you intend X to infer that p. 
 
It is worth noting that, while you have to intend to deceive 
someone, disinforming does not require that she actually ends up 
being deceived.  It is also worth noting that you must intend to 
deceive and not just intend to disseminate false information.  For 
example, every map is inaccurate to some degree and the 
cartographer who made the map knows it.  If certain features, 
such as roads, were really drawn to scale, they would be too small 
to see (cf. [21], p. 30).  But despite such inaccuracies, it is clearly 
not the case that all maps are disinformation.  Furthermore, the 
cartographer is not disinforming people even if they happen to be 
misled by such features. 
 
4.2 Actual Falsity 
However, D1 is still not restrictive enough.  In order to disinform, 
you have to intend that someone infer something that is actually 
false.  But it is possible to (deceptively) lie to someone even if 
you intend her to infer something that (unbeknownst to you) is 
actually true.  For example, suppose that the police ask you about 
your friend Ramon’s whereabouts and that you want to mislead 
them about where he is.  You believe that he is staying with his 
cousins outside the city.  So, you say to the police, “he is hidden 
in the cemetery.”  However, without your knowledge, Ramon has 
actually hidden himself in the cemetery.  In this case, you have 
lied to the police (cf. [26], [27], section 1.2).  But you have not 
disinformed them because what you intend them to believe is not 
actually false.  It is clear, for example, that librarians are primarily 
worried about their patrons getting information that actually is 
inaccurate (cf. [2], p. 134).  Thus, it might be suggested that you 
disinform if you say something that actually is false with the 
intent to deceive. 
 
(D2) You disinform X if and only if: 
  
1. You say that p to X. 
2. You believe that p is false. 
3. By saying p, you intend X to infer that p. 
4. p is false. 
 
4.3 Communicate Deceptively 
However, D2 is too restrictive.  You can disinform someone even 
if you know that what you are saying is true.  In order to 
disinform, you must intend to bring about a false belief.  But the 
actual information that you provide does not have to be false.  For 
example, suppose that a murderer asks about your friend Joe’s 
whereabouts and that you want to mislead him about where he is 
(cf. [28], pp. 437-38).  You believe that he is hiding in the 
basement.  So, you truthfully say to the murderer, “he’s been 
hanging around the drugstore a lot” intending that the murderer 
draw the false conclusion that he is at the drugstore now.  In this 
case, you have disinformed the murderer without saying anything 
that you believe to be false. 
 
Most philosophers think that you are not lying in such a case 
because you are saying something that you believe to be true (cf. 
[27], section 1.2).  But several people (e.g., [29], [30], [31]) have 
a broader notion of lying that counts such false implicatures (or 
“half-truths”) as lies.  These people think that it is the intention to 
deceive that really determines whether someone is lying.  Thus, 
according to these people, a liar does not have to say something 
that she believes to be false.  She just has to communicate 
something that she believes to be false.  Similarly, it might be 
suggested that you disinform if you communicate something false 
that you believe to be false. 
 
(D3) You disinform X if and only if: 
1. You communicate that p to X. 
2. You believe that p is false. 
3. By communicating p, you intend X to infer that p. 
4. p is false. 
 
4.4 Disseminate Misleading Information 
However, D3 is still too restrictive.  First, you can only 
communicate to someone.  But you can disinform someone 
without communicating anything directly to him.  For example, 
suppose that you want to trick your friend Benedick into believing 
that Beatrice is in love with him.  So, you say to a companion 
(who is in on your little scheme) that Beatrice is in love with 
Benedick when you know that Benedick is eavesdropping on your 
conversation.  In this case, you have disinformed Benedick.  In 
fact, this is the same sort of disinforming that happened with the 
fake radio transmissions during World War Two.  But you have 
not communicated to Benedick that Beatrice is in love with him.  
In order for you to do this, it would have to be completely open 
between the two of you that you have said that Beatrice is in love 
with him.  In other words, communicating has a common 
knowledge requirement that disinforming does not (cf. [31], 
section 3). 
 
Second, you can only communicate that some state of affairs 
obtains.  In other words, you must be expressing a proposition 
(e.g., that Beatrice is in love with Benedick).  But you can 
disinform without expressing any particular proposition.  For 
example, you can disinform with a doctored photograph or a 
falsified map.  Things like photographs and maps do not have 
propositional content.  In other words, they are not descriptions of 
the world that are either true or false.  These things only have 
representational content.  That is, they can simply be more or less 
accurate depictions of the world.5 
 
But we can easily fix both of these problems with D3 simply by 
replacing the communication requirement with the requirement 
that you simply disseminate some information. 
 
(D4) You disinform X if and only if: 
1. You disseminate information i. 
2. You believe that p is false. 
3. By disseminating information i, you intend X to infer 
that p. 
4. p is false. 
 
Now, to give a full account what it is to disinform, we really need 
to say exactly what information is.  And, in fact, there are many 
different (often conflicting) theories of information to choose 
from (cf. [3], pp. 39-74).  But D4 arguably provides a useful 
analysis of disinforming even if we simply assume a common 
sense understanding of what information is.  We just need to 
stipulate one substantive, and somewhat controversial, thing about 
the nature of information.  Namely, information need not be true 
or accurate (cf. [3], p. 160, [32]). 
 
While you can disinform by saying something true, in the 
prototypical cases of disinforming, you say something false.  For 
example, when the President said to the American people, “I did 
not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky,” he 
seemed to be disseminating false information.  However, 
according to several philosophers (e.g., [33], pp. 45-46, [34], pp. 
887-90, [35], 360-365), the President did not disseminate any 
information in this case; false or inaccurate information is not 
information at all.  As Fred Dretske puts it in [36], “false 
information, misinformation, and (grimace!) disinformation are 
not varieties of information—any more than a decoy duck is a 
kind of duck.”  But even for these philosophers, there is a broader 
category of stuff that encompasses both information and 
“inaccurate information.”  Namely, there is stuff with 
representational content.  And the term ‘information’ in D4 should 
simply be understood as referring to stuff with representational 
content.  
 
4.5 Reasonable to be Deceived 
However, even once we stipulate that information need not be 
true, D4 is still not quite right.  Even if you intend to deceive X, 
you have not disinformed X if it is not reasonable to infer p from 
the information that you have disseminated.  For example, if you 
say to the murderer, “Joe has been under the weather,” intending 
that he come to believe that Joe is at the drugstore now, you have 
not disinformed him.  In order for you to disinform someone, it 
has to be reasonable for her to draw the false conclusion that you 
intend them to draw.  In a similar vein, according to the Federal 
Trade Commission, in order to count as deceptive advertising, 
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 Even for people who endorse a narrow analysis of lying, lies do 
not have to be verbal utterances (cf. [27], section 1.1).  For 
example, you can lie by writing a letter or sending smoke signals.  
But you can disinform without using language at all. 
  
“the representation, omission or practice must be likely to mislead 
reasonable consumers” (quoted in [37], p. 188). 
 
(D5) You disinform X if and only if: 
1. You disseminate information i. 
2. You believe that p is false. 
3. You intend X to infer from information i that p.  
4. p is false. 
5. It is reasonable for X to infer from information i that 
p. 
 
More concisely, what is required for disinforming is that you 
disseminate some information (condition 1) that you intend to be 
misleading (conditions 2 and 3) and it actually is misleading 
(conditions 4 and 5).6 
 
It is worth noting that condition 5 rules out the articles in The 
Onion as cases of disinforming.  These articles are intended to be 
humorous rather than misleading.  But even if the editor of The 
Onion did hope to deceive her audience with a particular article, 
she would still not be disinforming them.  It would not be 
reasonable for people to infer that “Al Gore Places Infant Son in 
Rocket to Escape Dying Planet” from the fact that The Onion says 
so. 
 
4.6 Deceptive Content 
However, D5 is still not quite right.  The content of the 
information has to play a role in the deception.  Otherwise, we are 
just talking about run-of-the-mill deception.  For example, 
suppose that you truthfully say to King Arthur in a heavy French 
accent, “we’ve already got a Holy Grail” intending that he draw 
the false conclusion that you are francophone.  In this case, you 
have certainly attempted to deceive the King (using information), 
but you have not disinformed him (as long as you do have a Holy 
Grail).  You are no more disinforming him than if you had put on 
a beret intending that he draw the false conclusion that you are 
francophone.  If such cases counted as disinforming, it would 
arguably be just another word for deceiving. 
 
(D6) You disinform X if and only if: 
1. You disseminate information i. 
2. You believe that p is false. 
3. You intend X to infer from the content of information 
i that p.  
4. p is false. 
5. It is reasonable for X to infer from the content of 
information i that p. 
 
While the content must play a role in the deception, it should be 
noted that things beyond the content of the information can also 
play a role.  For example, if you create a map of South America to 
look like it was drawn by Europeans in the 17th century (e.g., on 
old parchment, with ornate lettering) to try to misled people into 
thinking that Machu Picchu was discovered in the 17th century, 
you would seem to be disinforming these people. 
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 Condition 5 just makes explicit something that is implicit in any 
analysis of lying.  For example, it goes without saying that, if you 
communicate p, then it is reasonable for someone to infer that p. 
4.7 Deception Foreseen 
However, it is possible that D6 is still not quite right.  There are 
cases where people spread “deliberately misleading information” 
but do not intend to deceive anyone by doing so.  In fact, in at 
least two of our examples of disinformation, it is not clear that the 
perpetrator really intended to deceive anyone.  For example, the 
person who modified the Seigenthaler entry on Wikipedia claimed 
that he was just playing a joke on a friend.  Also, the hacker who 
modified the Yahoo! News website apparently did so in order to 
alert people to the security vulnerabilities of the website.  
 
Now, it might be suggested that, in these cases, the perpetrator 
really did intend to deceive.  For example, the joke would not 
have been funny (maybe it was not funny anyway) if the friend 
had not been taken in.  In other words, deception was a necessary 
means to the ultimate goal of the perpetrator.  Also, if the hacker 
had really not wanted to deceive anybody, he could have exposed 
the security problem by simply vandalizing the Yahoo! News 
website rather than by posting a false news story. 
 
But there are other examples of “deliberately misleading 
information” where there is very clearly no intention to deceive.  
For example, many cartographers deliberately falsify their maps.  
In order to protect their intellectual property, many cartographers 
add a few features to their maps that do not really exist in the 
world (cf. [21], pp. 49-51).  If these non-existent features show up 
in another map of the same area, the cartographer has good 
evidence that her work has been copied.  But these cartographers 
do not intend to mislead map users about these non-existent 
features. 
 
Also, people have intentionally placed inaccurate information on 
the Internet for educational purposes (cf. [38], [39], p. 10).  For 
example, a website for the Oklahoma Association of Wine 
Producers and a website advertising a town in Minnesota as a 
tropical paradise were created to teach people how to identify 
inaccurate information on the Internet.  In fact, people (e.g., [2]) 
have intentionally placed inaccurate information on the Internet 
for research purposes as well.  For example, several researchers 
have put false information into Wikipedia to see how long it takes 
to get corrected (cf. [7], p. 1665). 
 
In all of these cases, the perpetrator has some goal other than 
deception that she is trying to achieve (such as teaching people 
how to evaluate websites or protecting her intellectual property).  
And she may be able to achieve this other goal even if no one is 
deceived.  In addition, this other goal may often be sufficiently 
laudable that it provides an excuse for having deceived someone.  
But it is important to note that having an excuse for having 
deceived someone does not mean that the perpetrator has not 
disinformed him. 
 
While disinforming may not require that the source of the 
misleading information intend to deceive people, it does at least 
require that the source of the information foresee that people will 
be deceived.7  In other words, unlike lying, disinforming is always 
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 Philosophers draw a distinction between (a) what a person 
intends to do by performing an action and (b) what a person 
simply foresees as a likely “side effect” of performing that action 
(cf. [24], p. 291).  But there is a debate over whether this 
  
about deception at some level.  For example, the cartographers 
know that some map users might end up believing that these non-
existent streets really exist.  Similarly, the hacker had to foresee 
that some people might end up believing his false news story.  So, 
what we may need to say is that you disinform if you believe that 
your information is misleading.8 
 
(D7) You disinform X if and only if: 
1. You disseminate information i. 
2. You believe that p is false. 
3. You foresee that X is likely to infer from the content 
of information i that p. 
4. p is false. 
5. It is reasonable for X to infer from the content of 
information i that p. 
 
Even if they do not intend to fool anybody, I am sure that the 
editors of The Onion can predict that they are going to fool at least 
a few people.  In fact, I hear many people say that, the first time 
that they read The Onion, they thought that it was for real.  But the 
editors of The Onion are not disinforming their audience because 
it is not reasonable to infer p from the fact The Onion says p.  
Even those people who are deceived initially are usually not 
deceived for very long.  So, the information on The Onion still 
does not count as disinformation under D7. 
 
4.8 Very Close to Lying 
If we understand deceptive lying in a sufficiently broad sense, 
disinforming is very close to deceptive lying.  However, it is 
worth noting that disinforming (whether we adopt D6 or D7) does 
not include all deceptive behavior.  For example, it excludes 
certain parts of the disinformation campaign used by the Allies 
during World War Two.  In addition to sending fake radio 
transmissions, the Allies built fake tanks and airplanes out of 
rubber and canvas to give the false impression that a huge force 
was preparing to attack Calais.  In this case, the Allies were not 
disinforming because they were not disseminating any 
information. 
 
Admittedly, we could weaken the analysis of disinforming to 
include such cases.  But then all deceptive behavior would count 
as disinforming.  In that case, we would not really need a separate 
term for the concept.  Also, it would not be a concept of specific 
interest to information science.   
 
5. DISINFORMATION 
Now that we understand the activity of disinforming, it is time to 
look at what disinformation itself is.  But this is pretty 
                                                                                 
distinction has any moral importance.  The debate here between 
D6 and D7 is over whether this distinction has any ontological 
significance with regard to whether an action counts as an 
instance of disinforming. 
8
 If you should have known that X would be misled by the 
information that you disseminated, you may very well be morally 
culpable.  But if you are sincerely surprised when X is actually 
misled, it still seems like an honest mistake on your part.  In other 
words, it is probably not sufficient for disinforming that it be 
reasonable for you to think that X is likely to be misled.  You 
have to at least foresee that X is likely to be misled. 
straightforward.  There is a clear-cut “linking principle” between 
the activity of disinforming and the phenomenon of 
disinformation (cf. [3], pp. 187-91).  Namely, disinformation is 
the information (i.e., the stuff with representational content) 
disseminated by someone who is disinforming.  Plugging the 
proposed analysis of disinforming from the preceding section into 
this principle, disinformation turns out to be misleading 
information that is intended to be (or at least foreseen to be) 
misleading. 
 
But there is at least one important complication that should be 
noted.  Disinformation does not have to come directly from 
someone who disinforms.  Something is still disinformation even 
if it has been innocently passed on to me by a friend, a librarian, 
or a reporter.  For example, when news services repeated the 
fraudulent press release about the Emulex Corporation, they were 
certainly passing along disinformation.  But unlike the creator of 
this fraudulent press release, the news services themselves were 
not disinforming the public.  They were only misinforming them.   
 
In order for something to count as disinformation, it clearly does 
not have to be the immediate source of the information who 
believes that the information is misleading.  In addition, it may 
not have to be the original source who believes that the 
information is misleading.  Information often passes through 
many hands before it reaches the end user.  It may be enough that 
one of these intermediaries believes that the information is 
misleading.  In the case of the historical fabrications discussed by 
Sowards in [13], the original authors undoubtedly foresaw that the 
information was misleading.  Thus, such historical fabrications 
certainly count as disinformation.  However, in other cases, even 
if the original authors believed that the information was accurate, 
other people may come along later and spread the same 
information further with the intent to deceive.   
 
In fact, we might even want to consider out-of-date medical 
information in the library to be disinformation (cf. [40], p. 83).  
While the original authors of an old medical textbook may have 
been completely sincere, the librarian may foresee that he is 
passing along information that is likely to mislead some 
patrons. Thus, at least if we adopt D7 as our analysis of 
disinforming, such a case would count as disinformation.9 
 
Finally, it is also worth emphasizing that, while disinformation 
will typically be inaccurate, it does not have to be inaccurate.  It 
just has to be misleading.  So, disinformation is actually not a 
proper subset of inaccurate information. 
 
6. APPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
As noted in the introduction, information scientists are confronted 
with several important questions about disinformation.  In this 
final section, I briefly gesture at how the foregoing analysis of 
disinformation might be used to help answer a couple of these 
                                                 
9
 If the librarian puts the old medical textbook in the reference 
collection, it definitely seems like disinformation.  But if the 
librarian puts the textbook in the main collection, it may not be 
disinformation because it is not reasonable for the patron to 
conclude that what the textbook says is true.  After all, libraries 
collect many books for their historical value rather than for their 
accuracy. 
  
questions.  Most notably, because our conceptual analysis 
indicates that disinforming is very close to deceptive lying, we 
can often leverage existing research on lying. 
 
6.1 The Prevalence of Disinformation 
First, a greater understanding of what disinformation is can 
potentially help us to determine how big of a problem 
disinformation really is and where the problem lies.  According to 
many people (e.g., [41]), disinformation is everywhere.  But such 
a conclusion is largely based on anecdotal evidence.  Empirical 
studies (e.g., [42]) have looked at how much inaccurate 
information is on the Internet.  But these studies have not looked 
specifically at how much of this inaccurate information is 
“deliberately misleading.”  Even in the absence of an empirical 
study, however, we can potentially use game theory to predict 
how prevalent disinformation will be in particular contexts. 
 
Elliot Sober has constructed a game theoretic model of deceptive 
lying in [43].  Since disinforming is very close to deceptive lying, 
Sober’s model can arguably be applied to disinforming as well.10  
According to this model, whether a person will disinform depends 
on the expected costs and benefits.  In particular, it depends on the 
costs of not being believed (weighted by the probability that this 
will happen) as compared with the benefits of being believed 
(weighted by the probability that this will happen).  Thus, there 
will be a lot of disinformation if the benefits of being believed are 
high relative to the costs of not being believed and/or if the 
intended audience of the disinformation is much more likely to be 
credulous than to be skeptical.11 
 
We can use this model to account for the prevalence of 
disinformation in certain contexts.  For example, this model 
arguably explains why we might expect a lot of half-truths and 
outright lies in an election campaign.  There are significant 
benefits to being believed (in particular, by swing voters) and not 
much downside if you are caught lying (because the people who 
would be most incensed would not have voted for you any way). 
 
6.2 The Identification of Disinformation 
Second, a greater understanding of what disinformation is can 
potentially help us to identify disinformation so that people can 
avoid being misled by it.  In the previous sections, I described the 
properties that a piece of information must have in order to count 
as disinformation.  But it is no simple matter to determine whether 
a particular piece of information actually has those properties. 
 
Since disinforming is very close to lying, a lot of the vast research 
on lie detection can potentially be applied to disinformation 
detection.  Researchers in lie detection have focused primarily on 
physiological indicators of deception, such as perspiration and 
high pulse rate (cf. [29], pp. 51-52).  However, we do not always 
                                                 
10
 Understanding exactly how disinforming differs from lying 
may suggest ways to refine this model. 
11
 Whether the intended audience is more likely to be credulous or 
to be skeptical depends on their cost-benefit analysis.  In 
particular, will the benefits of acquiring a true belief (weighted by 
the probability that this will happen) outweigh the costs of 
acquiring a false belief (weighted by the probability that this will 
happen)? 
come into direct physical contact with sources of disinformation.  
And even if we do come into direct physical contact, we are rarely 
in a position to give this source a polygraph test.  But techniques 
have also been developed that can be used to identify lies in 
recorded information.  For example, researchers have used textual 
analysis to find that liars are somewhat less likely to use first-
person pronouns (cf. [44]).12 
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